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Levinson: Electoral Regulation: Some Comments

ELECTORAL REGULATION: SOME
COMMENTS
Sanford Levinson*
In this campaign finance Symposium, Stephen Gottlieb and
Daniel Lowenstein present the latest of their important contributions' to the debate about what is almost certainly the most pressing
first amendment issue of our time-the ability of the state apparatus
to control the structure of elections whose main ostensible purpose is,
of course, to select those who will become officials of the state apparatus.2 This contribution will be limited,3 raising questions in response to each of their thought-provoking essays, rather than engag* Charles McCormick Professor, University of Texas. A.B. Duke University, 1962; Ph.D.
Harvard University, 1969; J.D. Stanford, 1973.
1. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign FinanceReform, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv.
213 (1989); Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply
Rooted, 18 HOESTRA L. REV. 301 (1989).
2. This language may put off some who would prefer language like "the ability of the
public" to "the ability of the state apparatus" and who would prefer "who will become public
officials" to "who will become officials of the state apparatus." No language, of course, is truly
neutral in its connotations. I reject the former language because it presupposes far too easily
that "the public" genuinely controls legislative decisions about electoral structures and that the
persons elected view themselves as true "public" servants.
"The public" is clearly a reified entity; there is no "public" that decides or elects. There
are constellations of groups that purport to act in the name of "the public" and thus seize the
legitimacy that comes today through reference to that notion. See, e.g., E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE (1988) (exploring these concepts in detail). Contemporary "public
choice" theory joins classical Marxism in its skepticism of the ability of state officials to serve
some abstract "public interest." See J. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS 969 (1984).
The term "state apparatus" may go too far in the other direction insofar as it serves to
suggest that there is nothing special about the state, in terms of theoretical analysig or political
legitimacy, as opposed to any other organizational apparatus. This should underscore the extent to which the debate about campaign finance is about nothing less than the nature and
legitimacy of the modern state.
3. My prior contribution to the electoral regulation and first amendment debate consists
of a fairly short review of Elizabeth Drew's book, Politics and Money. See Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road to Contradiction, 83 MICH. L. REV. 939 (1985) (reviewing E. DREW, POLITICS & MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983)). Professor
Lowenstein pays me the compliment of attacking my viewpoints expressed in that book review
on several occasions. See Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 301 n.3, 346 n.199.
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ing in a full-scale analysis of the issues involved. The essays of
Gottlieb and Lowenstein are significantly different in style and argument. I find each frustrating, though for different reasons.
I. DANIEL LOWENSTEIN AND THE POLITICS OF "INTEREST"
Here, as in all of his writings, Lowenstein makes a number of
important arguments very well. He persuades me that some comments I have previously made4 might have been too glib. Over the
last five years, I have become more willing to countenance arguments that the way we fund elections has deleteriously affected the
nature of democracy within the United States. 5 I read Professor
Lowenstein's article with a significant degree of sympathy. Yet, if I
have become agnostic-rather than militantly atheistic-regarding
the issue of regulating campaign finance, Lowenstein's arguments do
not move me any further toward conversion to the status of a genuine believer.
In particular, I remain unpersuaded by any analysis that expresses justified worry about the impact of money on the behavior of
public officials and, at the same time, wholly ignores the power of
the media6 to influence these same public officials in part through
the media's ability to structure public consciousness. Almost a decade ago my colleague, L.A. Powe, queried why Congress should be
able to limit the ability to influence the outcomes of elections of everyone, except those fortunate enough to be owners of mass media.7
One would have thought that in the ensuing years supporters of cam4. Levinson, supra note 3.
5. 1 write these words in early October, 1989, shortly after the House of Representatives
voted for a scandalous reduction in the tax rate applied to capital gains. I cannot believe sixtyfour Democrats would have voted for this bill-thereby presenting a gift principally to the
well-off-if they were not so dependent on campaign contributions from that sector of the
population which is most likely to benefit from the bill. I expect Republicans to vote for the
interests of the rich. The fact that approximately one-quarter of the Democrats followed that
vote calls out for an explanation. See Reich, Have the Democrats Lost their Soul? Yes: Blame
Election Funds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1989, at 21, col. 1.
6. The power of the media flows from the economic resources prerequisite to ownership.
Cf. Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 243, 244 n.1
(stating that "[a]lthough there are no Supreme Court cases to prove it, Presidents-from
George Washington on-were hounded and bothered not by puny anonymities but by people
who knew how to use whatever form of mass communication was at hand.").
7. See id. at 267-68 (asserting that the problem of "drowning out" opposing viewpoints
by television media could be remedied by federal regulations; however, regulating newspapers
in such a manner was constitutionally prohibited); see also Tushnet, Corporationsand Free
Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 253 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (discussing the role of media and

corporations in the marketplace of ideas).
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paign finance limitations and supporters of an unfettered press might
have attempted to answer Powe's query, but this has not occurred. It
may be true that my reference to the disproportionate role played by
celebrities8 is "overdrawn or of little practical significance," 9 but, I
do not think that is the case with television networks, major newspapers and other forms of mass media. The potential for conflicts of
interests at the heart of Lowenstein's analysis l° is also present when
a candidate confronts the owners and editors of major newspapers on
issues and when such a candidate beseeches the same owners and
editors to support to his or her campaign. There are many ways "to
tempt men and women to stray not only from their ethical responsibilities but from their own highest interests ....

I'l"The offer of cash

is only one of them. I do not expect Professor Lowenstein, or anyone
else, to present a fully " 'coherent and consistent theory' "12 of polit-

ics or even of the first amendment, but I do expect more than he
offers. This expectation comes not from a desire for intellectual elegance for its own sake, but because the role of mass media is of
"systemic significance."' 3
I should, of course, discuss the paper and proposal that Lowenstein did write, rather than criticize him for not writing a quite different paper. In reviewing the solution Lowenstein proffers to solve
some of the problems presented by financing congressional elections,
I note that he is placing extraordinary confidence in congressional
leadership for the proper distribution of campaign funds.' 4 I do not
have that same confidence for two different reasons.
The first reason is purely political and concerns the wisdom of
Lowenstein's proposal as a matter of public policy. I severely doubt
the political wisdom of placing so much raw power in the hand of
relatively few men (and I'use the gender term advisedly) who currently head, or seem likely in the near future to head, the respective
political parties in Congress. Still, it is possible that further reflection
would lead me to believe that Lowenstein can answer this objection.
However, that resolution only brings up the second reason for a lack
of confidence in Lowenstein's proposal-the sheer implausibility of
8. Levinson, supra note 3, at 948-50.
9. Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 301 n.3.
10. See id. at 322-29 (discussing the campaign finance question as a conflicts of interests
problem).

11.

Id. at 302.

12.
13.
14.

Id. at 302.
Id. at 301 n.3.
See id. at 351-55 (utilizing congressional leadership in Lowenstein's proposals).
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its adoption. Given the extraordinary fragmentation that, for better
and almost certainly for worse, characterizes our party system, I find
it next to inconceivable that Congress might vote for a scheme that
would instantly transfer significant power from back-bench legislators to senior congressional leaders.
To offer such reservations about Lowenstein's analysis is by no
means to "refute" it. However, by his own admission, Lowenstein's
article is far more an elaborate and richly worked-out policy proposal than an attempt to present a " 'coherent and consistent theory' "
of the First Amendment. 1 5 A full response to Lowenstein's analysis
would require far more immersion in the specific literature cited. I
merely register these caveats.

II.

THE ABSTRACTED LIBERTARIANISM OF STEPHEN GOTTLIEB

I am in a strange position regarding Professor Gottlieb's long
and learned article expressing "The Dilemma of Election Campaign
Finance Reform."'1 On one hand I tend to agree with its libertarian
thrust and its suspicion about the constitutionality of most, if not all,
of suggested campaign finance "reforms."' 7 On the other hand, I am
disturbed at the tone of the article which seems unnecessarily and
implausibly complacent, and unwilling to recognize the possible legitimacy of concerns expressed by many thoughtful observers regarding the realties and consequences of contemporary electoral financing.' 8 There are moments when Gottlieb seems to doubt that
any state-imposed changes on the current electoral regime would
pass constitutional muster.' 9 At other times, Gottlieb appears to
doubt that any change would be desirable as a matter of political
theory-regardless of constitutionality.2 0 To the extent that there are
imperfections, all of them, at least as expressed by Gottlieb, seem to
be those regulations we now tolerate, such as contribution limits,
rather than the consequences of the lack of regulation, such as those
15, See id. at 301-02 n. 3.
16. See Gottlieb, supra note 1.
17. See id. at 216-17, 279-80.
18. I find myself with some of the same feelings I often have when I discuss "the adversary system" in my professional responsibility course. Many students believe that this rather
inchoate term refers to exactly the system in existence in Texas on that date, and that any
proposal for change is viewed not as a relatively minor modification of what will remain "the
adversary system," but rather a proposal to junk entirely the "adversary system" and replace
it with some presumably totalitarian alternative.
19. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 228.
20. See id. at 298-99.
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outlined by Professor Lowenstein.
Although I have argued that much "reform" is properly viewed
as unconstitutional," the tone of Gottlieb's article made me wish to
tack in the opposite direction and argue that the reform is constitutional. It is simply too complacent about the glories of a relatively
unregulated campaign-contribution market, and I want to resist his
blandishments.
There can be no doubt that Professor Gottlieb's argument rests
on a remarkable faith in the marketplace.22 There are at least two
problems worth mentioning. The first problem relates to the reification of the term "the market economy. "23 We are not told the precise contours of "the market economy" and why we should accept it
as "defin[ing] a baseline." 24 Even if "the market economy is treated
as a public interest worth protecting," 25 does this mean that the present constellation of campaign regulation is precisely the right mix
so that all deviations therefrom (at least in the direction of greater
regulation) are unconstitutional? According to Gottlieb, "[t]he market system appears to provide a justification for economic inequalities sufficiently compelling that they need not be dismantled to satisfy the requirements of democratic political processes. 2 6 However,
regulation does not entail dismantling unless a great many thoroughly libertarian assumptions that only a particular version of nineteenth century laissez-faire is a "genuine" market economy or system can be smuggled in.
As Cass Sunstein and my colleague, Jack Balkin, have pointed
out, we have been through all of this at least once before in regards
to arguments that the legitimacy of a mildly redistributive welfare
state grew out of political developments in the early twentieth century. As a political matter, we accepted a redistributive welfare
21. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 954-48.
22. In fairness to Professor Gottlieb, he does distance himself from "any a priori preference for a market solution to democratic problems or any general faith in [the] fairness" of
market outcomes. Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 227 n.63. Nonetheless, he continues to endorse
"the market system . . . as a compelling governmental interest." Id.
23. See id. at 226 n. 63, 232-34; see also supra note 19 (discussing the reification of
"the adversary system," a similar term).
24. Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 226 n.63.

25. Id.
26.
27.

Id. at 297.
See Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Deconstructive Approaches to the First

Amendment (forthcoming in the April 1990 issue of the Duke Law Journal); Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877 (1987) (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.

45 (1905), which involved a regulation enacted by the state "prohibiting employers from per-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:411

state out of a desire to tame the ravages of a market economy. 28 This

development required, to the great dismay of constitutional conservatives, that the Supreme Court and ultimately our general legal culture dismiss what had theretofore been altogether plausible arguments based on traditional readings of the contract clause or of the
notion of "freedom of contract" that had -been deemed, for at least
two generations, part of the "liberty" protected by a strong notion of
due process. 29 The question is whether we are now undergoing an
analogous process in taming what are widely thought to be the
ravages of an unregulated political economy."0
Gottlieb is correct that the dominant strand of American political and constitutional culture justifies some kind of market economy-and its attendant inequalities.3 The key question is what particular justifications are proferred for these inequalities. The answer
lies in the proposition that more goods are produced efficiently with
the incentives of profits and the disincentives of losses. Many argue,
moreover, that the maintenance of some kind of private-property system linked to a market structure is instrumental to maintaining a
requisite degree of political liberty. 2 This argument was made by
many of our eighteenth century "republican" forbears.33 However,
many of them were also vigorous critics of the commercial, consumption-oriented and egoistic society that they saw developing on the
mitting or requiring bakers to work for more than sixty hours in one week.").
28. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 881-83 (arguing that the intervention of the Supreme
Court to redistribute wealth in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45, was a recognition of the inequitability
of use of the free market as a baseline for measure of the constitutionality of political interference into previously private matters).
29. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a minimum
wage law directed at women).
30. See Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987) (stating that "[t]he
market may be splendid for some purposes, but not.., for producing the kind of debate that
constantly renews the capacity of a people for self-determination."); Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REY. 1405, 1419-13 (1986) (stating that "[t]he market-even
one that operates smoothly and efficiently-does not assure that all relevant views will be
heard, but only those advocated by the rich, by those who can borrow from others, or by those
who can put together a product that will attract sufficient advertisers or subscribers to sustain
the enterprise."). But see Powe, Scholarship and Markets, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172, 186
(1987) (arguing that Fiss' conception of a regulated marketplace of ideas has no constitutional
basis and its essentially a case of "the tail wagging the dog.").
31. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 286-90; see also id. at 296-98 (stating that "It]he
market system appears to provide a justification for economic inequalities which are suffi").
ciently compelling that they need not be dismantled ....
32.
33.

See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1982).
See J. DIGGINS, supra note 2, at 97.
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horizon.34 Alexander Hamilton was more the exception than the rule
in his joyful acceptance of the prospect of political dominance by the
wealthy.35 More often, the wealthy were distrusted and much
thought was given to constructing institutional mechanisms to limit
their influence. Almost no one believed that there should be no
bounds to what winning or losing could mean.a"
An important modern statement of this perspective can be
found in Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice. 3 7 Walzer discusses
various "spheres" of society and argues that our culture distinguishes among these spheres on the basis of the appropriateness of
monetary resources controlling the distribution of goods found within
each sphere.38 For example, we might adopt a principle of allocating
non-subsistence food by financial resources in order to provide,
among other reasons, incentives for persons to work harder in order
to eat steak instead of equally nutritious beans and yogurt. Similar
arguments might be made for vacationing in exotic places and wearing designer clothes. However, Walzer attacks any facile reliance on
market mechanisms of distribution of such commodities as health
and educational services.39 I have criticized Walzer for his failure to
address the problem of campaign finance in view of the difficulties it
poses for his general theory,40 but I have little trouble accepting the
general distinctions among goods and services. Gottlieb argues tendentiously when he suggests that support of a market economy for
some purposes logically entails acceptance of its dominance in all
aspects of society. 4 ' One must demonstrate, rather than assert, that
what are relatively modest changes in the way we finance elections
would truly diminish the freedoms we enjoy in American society.
Gottlieb is correct in saying that "limitations on campaign fi34. The most dramatic example is provided by John Adams who detested the nascent
capitalists found on Boston's State Street and joined in the widespread suspicion of the impli-

cations for republican governance of a "commercial" sensibility. See id. at 349. As pithily
summarized by John Patrick Diggins, "Adams suspected the rule of money and the tempta-

tions of affluence." See id.
at 55.
35. See id. at 339 (noting that "[t]he framers wisely distrusted the pretensions to altruism and benevolence of all classes, and thus Adams and Madison placed checks on Hamilton's
'rich, well-born, and able.' ").
36. See J. DIGGINS, supra note 2, at 334-46.
37. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). Among other arguments, Walzer suggests
that capitalists will become tyrants if not opposed by government. See id.at 316-18.

38. See id.at 119-22.
39. See id.
40. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 946.
41.

See Gottlieb, supra note 1,at 286-90.
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nance require more justification than popular approval. It is necessary to ascertain that they do not damage popular control. 42 However, Gottlieb's notion of ascertainment is bereft of empirical
reference. One consequence of Gottlieb's argumentative approach is
that the reader might be lead to believe that the existing status quo
is not only consistent with an acceptable theory of democratic decision making (which may be true), but also a necessary condition for
decision making to be called "democratic" (which is surely implausible). Would Gottlieb seriously argue that Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, West Germany and Israel (to take some
non-random examples), cannot be described as sufficiently "democratic" because all have adopted electoral-regulation schemes significantly different from our laissez-faire process? If I am correct that
Gottlieb would not describe each and every one of these countries as
inferior to the United States in its commitment to electoral democracy, then perhaps he should rethink the extent of his opposition to
most suggested changes in the present scheme of electoral regulation. At the very least, a comparative dimension would deepen his
analysis and serve as a valuable corrective to the classic ethnocentrism that characterizes these, as well as many other debates in the
United States.
There is at least one occasion when Gottlieb undercuts his overall argument by virtue of a specific example within the United
States. Consider Gottlieb's professed optimism in the jury system.43
The conclusion that "juries generally reach the correct conclusions," 44 cuts against Gottlieb's general libertarianism inasmuch as
the process by which juries get information is controlled in ways that
would clearly violate the first amendment if generalized beyond the
jury forum. Imagine, for example, a public official empowered to decide if certain arguments were irrelevant, 45 prejudicial4" or merely
cumulative,47 not to mention having to qualify as an expert witness.48
Gottlieb's esteem for the jury similarly contradicts his statement that
"restrictions on information makes matters worse, to the extent that
rationality is possible."49
Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 266.
Id.
See FED. R. EvID. 401.
See FED. R. EVID. 403.
See id.
48. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
49. Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 270; see also id. at 272 (pronouncing a "restricted envi42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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The last thing I want to do is argue from the example of information flow to the jury to any general theory of electoral information
flow. But at the very least, the example should make us aware of
some of the limits of purely "principled," formal argument. Gottlieb
tries to maintain a preserve for old-fashioned formalism in an era
where almost all constitutional law has become a balancing process.5 0 As hard as it is to admit, I no longer find first amendment
formalism more persuasive than formalism drawn from other, less
favored, clauses.
The principal focus of Gottlieb's analysis is limitation on the
amounts of campaign contributions and spending.51 There is one important collateral issue that Gottlieb leaves almost undiscussed: compelled disclosure of campaign contributors. "[T]he justification of
the first amendment is, in relevant part, that it helps to inform popular government." 52 I agree with this statement. But why would not
disclosure mechanisms then be especially justifiable as means of
maximizing relevant information? Does the electorate need information only about a limited range of views and the justifications
thereof, or might information that a candidate is receiving a great
deal of financial support from particular contributors with significant
stakes in particular political outcomes be immensely valuable to the
electorate? At the very least, it is highly paternalistic to suggest that
a public desiring such information really does not need it and would
be better off without it.
Although I believe that Buckley v. Valeo53 is a truly terrible
decision insofar as it upheld compelled disclosure of contributions
over $100 and record-keeping of contributions over $10, 54 I have no
problems with compelled disclosure of contributions over, say, $1000.
The reason for objecting to compelled disclosure is the possibility of
retaliation against a vulnerable person for supporting an unpopular
candidate or position. I find it hard to imagine that anyone who can
afford a $1000 contribution is going to be particularly vulnerable. In
any event, the electorate is entitled to know who are the substantial
supporters of candidates for public office. I don't know whether Gotronment less rational than an unrestricted one.")
50.

See generally Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.

943 (1987) (expressing distinct unhappiness with this trend).
51.

See generally Gottlieb, supra note 1.

52. Id. at 247.
53. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
54. See id. at 62.
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tlieb would accept such disclosure.
III.

CONCLUSION

Anyone writing within the genre of comments will necessarily
concentrate on the weaknesses of the analyses rather than on its
strengths; I have certainly done that here. However, I am certain
that the articles by Professors Lowenstein and Gottlieb have much to
teach any careful reader. I am also confident that Professors Lowenstein and Gottlieb will continue to play important roles in the presumably unending debates over the propriety of changes in the way
we finance our political campaigns. That being said, I am not confident that these particular articles have moved the debate very far
forward.
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